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NOTES

conspiracy aspects of both statutes, cases will frequently present a violation of
both. If Congress really intends a four-year statute of limitation, single damages,
and only prima facie use of previously established evidence, then the False
Claims Act will have to be modified as it applies to conspiracy. After Beatrice
Foods the Government, as an antitrust damage plaintiff, would be foolish not
to include a False Claims count. In fact, with the exception of very few and
limited circumstances, "' section 4A of the Clayton Act might well become a
dead letter.
M. Russell Kruse, Jr.

The Flagrantly Illegal Arrest Up The Poisonous Tree and Past Wade
Four FBI agents obtained a warrant for the arrest of Reggie Oliver, executed the warrant at Oliver's apartment, and then attempted to leave the neighborhood. They were immediately confronted by a crowd of forty to fifty people
who had been summoned by Oliver's sister-in-law. The crowd, shouting epithets
and threatening to kill the agents unless they released Oliver, caused the escape
of the prisoner and injury to the officers. The next morning other agents were
told to return to the neighborhood to arrest Oliver, his sister-in-law, and any
others who participated in the assault. The arrest of the other participants was
to be based upon their failure to have Selective Service cards in their possession.
A photograph of Oliver was distributed to the agents, but members of the mob
were vaguely described as "young and black." The agents returned to the neighborhood and arrested the defendants for failure to have Selective Service cards.
The defendants were taken to headquarters where they were placed before the
assaulted agents for identification without the presence of counsel. The assaulted agents' subsequent in-court identification of the defendants was admitted
over objection, and a conviction followed. Held, reversed with instructions to
dismiss the indictment: In-court testimony obtained as a result of a flagrantly
illegal arrest executed "for the very purpose of exhibiting a person before the
victim and with a view toward having any resulting identification duplicated
at trial" is barred by the exclusionary rule. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1970).
I. THE POISONOUS TREE AND ITs HISTORICAL GROWTH

The "fruit of the poisonous tree"' doctrine, when coupled with the "exclu-

sionary rule,"' excludes from use in a criminal prosecution that evidence which
9' See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.

'The phrase was coined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
'The "exclusionary rule" excludes illegally obtained evidence from use at trial. The
"fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," on the other hand, traces the use of illegally obtained
information from the primary illegality to the introduction of evidence which was gathered
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is obtained as a result of the exploitation of prior illegal conduct by law enforcement officials. The doctrine's roots can be traced to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Weeks v. United States:' evidence seized during an
illegal search is to be excluded at trial. Weeks, which became the touchstone
for later cases in which the "exclusionary rule" was applied, set the stage for
the Court's holding in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.' In Silverthorne federal agents illegally seized documents, photographed the desired information, returned the originals, and then attempted to compel production of
the originals at trial. The Court refused to admit either the photographs or the
originals, even though only the photographs had been illegally obtained. Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, advanced the basis of the "poisonous
tree doctrine," stressing that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way [is not merely that] evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."'
Nardone v. United States? prompted a reconsideration of whether illegally
obtained information could be used to gather other evidence. The Court refused
to allow the prosecution to introduce evidence discovered as a result of information gained by illegal wiretapping.7 The rationale for the decision was that
the exclusion of only the exact words overheard, and the permission of derivative use of the intercepted telephone messages, would largely stultify the policy
which compelled reversal of a conviction in the same case two years earlier.8
Both Silverthorne and Nardone adopted the "independent source rule" as an
exception to the "poisonous tree doctrine." As stated in Nardone, the exception
is that facts "improperly obtained do not become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source, they may be proved
like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong
cannot be used by it simply because it is used derivatively."" Nardone, in addition, enunciated a second exception to the doctrine. "Attenuation of the taint"
may break the casual connection between the illegal activity and the Government's proof."0 Thus, when the primary illegality is sufficiently removed from
the evidence submitted, that evidence is admissible. The application of this exas a result of exploitation of that primary illegality. The latter doctrine then employs the
exclusionary rule to bar such evidence from use at trial.
3232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4251 U.S. 385 (1920).
1d. at 392.
'308 U.S. 338 (1939).
Id. at 341. For a more detailed treatment of the use of the exclusionary rule in wiretapping cases, see United States v. Coplan, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Pitler,
Eavesdropping and Wiretapping-The Aftermath of Katz and Kaiser: A Comment, 34
BROOKLYN L. REv. 223 (1968).
8 308 U.S. at 40. The case reversed two years earlier involved a conviction based on a
conversation which was overheard in violation of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1970). See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
'308 U.S. at 341, quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920). The "independent source rule" has also been referred to as the "facts-evidence
theory." One writer has suggested a similarity between this theory and the proximate cause
concept in the law of torts. "No taint attaches unless such evidence is the natural, probable,
and foreseeable consequence of the wiretapping." Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree: A Fresh Appraisal of the Civil Liberties Involved in Wiretapping and Its Derivative
Use, 37 ILL. L. REV. 99, 106 (1942).
" 308 U.S. at 341.
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ception calls for a case-by-case approach, relying on the "learning, good sense,
fairness and courage of federal trial judges."11
Wong Sun v. United States" is the most comprehensive case concerning the
"fruit of the poisonous tree." A, who had been illegally arrested, informed federal agents that B possessed narcotics. When B was arrested by the agents he
surrendered heroin and made statements implicating C. C, arraigned and then
released on his own recognizance, voluntarily returned and confessed. The federal agents admitted that no drugs would have been found without A's assistance.
The Court found the narcotics to be "fruit of the poisonous tree" because
their discovery stemmed from A's illegal arrest. Mr. Justice Brennan, for the
Court, then set out the "independent source" and "attenuation of the taint"
exceptions. The controlling question, however, was whether the evidence had
been obtained "by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."" The Court excluded the
narcotics from the evidence against A. Since the discovery of the narcotics was
directly traceable to A's illegal arrest, exclusion was also warranted in B's case.
However, the Court held the narcotics to be admissible against C because his
statements were made subsequent to the seizure and did not contribute to discovery of the narcotics. C's confession was also held to be admissible. Because
C, after being arrested and released on his own recognizance, returned voluntarily to confess, the connection between his illegal arrest and subsequent voluntary confession had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.""'
"Fruit of the poisonous tree" evolved from the "exclusionary rule" in Weeks
into a somewhat independent doctrine, as demonstrated by Wong Sun. Nevertheless, the doctrine still depends upon the operation of the exclusionary rule.
The two concepts work together to bar from use at trial any evidence obtained
through exploitation of prior illegal police conduct. Evolving with the doctrine,
the independent-source rule and the attenuation-of-the-taint rule have become
recognized exceptions."
" Id. at 342. This procedure has been described as "vague" and as "leading to uncertainty." However, it seems to be justified, "for in placing control in the hands of the trial
judge the admissibility of the evidence will be decided upon by the one best able to understand what the justice of the particular situation requires." Note, Further Restrictions On
the Admissibility of Illegally-Obtained Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 758, 759 (1940).
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), attempted to clarify the "attenuation
of the taint" exception. The facts in Costello involved an illegal wiretap and its connection
with defendant's in-court admission. The Court held that defendant's admissions were made
on the presumption that the authorities had been accumulating information over a period
of time and were not compelled by the illegal wiretap. Costello noted an independent
source of information and a connection between the illegal wiretap and the admission of

guilt so "attenuated" as to remove the taint from the illegal wiretap.
12371 U.S. 471 (1963).
13Id. at 488.

"Id. at 491, quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
"The "inevitable discovery" rule has been cited as a third exception. To establish this
exception the prosecution must "satisfy the court, as a fact, that the preferred evidence would
have been acquired through lawful sources of informaion even if the illegal act had never
taken place." Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. 307, 317 (1964).
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UNITED STATES V. WADE-A SPECIES OF POISONOUS TREE

In United States v. Wade'6 the defendant was indicted for the robbery of a
federally insured bank. Subsequent to the indictment and without notice to his
attorney, the defendant was placed in a police line-up before two witnesses.
The Court held such a line-up to be violative of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, the rationale being that a line-up was a critical stage of
prosecution, one in which denial of counsel would prejudice the accused's right
to a fair trial.17 The Court further held that enforcement of the requirement for
presence of counsel necessitated the application of the exclusionary rule. When
the right to counsel is violated, resultant line-up and in-court identifications
are presumptively excluded as evidence at trial. The Court concluded that the
courtroom identification would be admissible in such cases only if the state
could show that the identification was not obtained by the primary illegality,
but had an independent source. Thus, Wade employed Wong Sun reasoning,
the illegal line-up in Wade representing the counterpart of the primary illegality which gives rise to an application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. The in-court identification was the "fruit" of the tainted pretrial
identification procedure. In either case, if the prosecution can demonstrate that
the testimony to be excluded has an origin independent of the illegal conduct,
the exclusionary rule does not operate.
III.

UNITED STATES V. EDMONS

In United States v. Edmons8 Judge Friendly's majority opinion recognized
the district court's finding that the arrests of the defendants were illegal, a
finding which was uncontested by the Government. The arrests were illegal
because they were pretextual; i.e., the actual reason for the arrests was to make
the defendants available for identification by the injured agents."9 Hence, the
arrests for failure to have Selective Service cards in their possession were made
in pursuance of a scheme."
Judge Friendly then analyzed the position taken by the Government in the
lower court. The Government relied on an exception to the rule pertaining
to illegal line-ups announced in Wade, which allows in-court identification
when based on an "independent source." The Government attempted to establish the independent source by proving that "before the illegal line-up
there was already such a definite image in the witness' mind that he [was] able
to rely on it at trial'without much, if any help" from the line-up. 1 The Gov"'388 U.S. 218 (1967); see Note, Lawyers and Line-ups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
See also Note, Right to Counsel at Pretrial Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in
Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 65 (1967).
17388 U.S. at 237.
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
18432
' 9 1d. at 583.
21 "Moreover, the F.B.I.'s failure to take the five men promptly before a Commissioner
and the absence of any proceeding against Pacheco confirm that appellant's failure to have
their draft cards immediately available was not the true reason for the arrests and that these
were motivated rather by the hope that the agents who had been attacked the preceding
evening might be able to identify some or all of the young blacks brought to F.B.I. headquarters." Id. at 582.
21 Id. Like the "attenuation of the taint" exception, this standard suffers from vagueness
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ernment stressed the weight an appelate court gives in such cases "to the de22
termination of the judge who saw and heard the witness.""
The defendants' argument for reversal of the district court decision did not
depend upon Wade." The defendants relied upon Wong Sun. Wong Sun, as
examined earlier, viewed the critical issue as "whether, granting establishment
of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.""4 The defendants contended
that since the exploitation of the illegal arrest was a prerequisite to the in-court
identification, the identification should have been considered "fruit of the
poisonous tree."
The court in Edmons ultimately followed Wong Sun, never really encountering the Wade problem. An analogy may clarify the court's position.
Consider the illegal arrest as creating a Pandora's Box, full of tainted evidence
and not to be opened. Because the box is not opened, the underlying Wade
problem concerning the illegal line-up and its connection to the in-court testimony is never examined. The keys that will open the box, by severing the
connection between the tainted evidence and the illegal arrest, are the independent-source and attenuation-of-the-taint exceptions. Until the link between
the illegal arrest and the in-court identification is broken, no inquiry will be
made into the relationship between the illegal line-up and the testimony adduced at trial. For this reason, the court did not reach the question of whether
the illegal line-up warranted reversal.
IV.

FRUITS AND FLAGRANCY

The Independent Source and Its Application. In Edmons the Government actually established a source of identification independent of the illegal line-up.
This independent source was the image of the defendants which had become
fixed in the minds of the injured agents at the time of Oliver's arrest. 5 The
Government asserted that the agents' recollections were independent of any
identification occurring between the time of the agents' initial confrontation
with their attackers and the final identification at trial. This independent
source is a well-founded exception to Wade and critical to the issue of whether
illegal line-ups require exclusion of tainted in-court testimony." However,
and may rest solely in the discretion of the trial judge. Nevertheless, it has been all but
established as an inflexible rule. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d
912 (2d Cir. 1970).
22432 F.2d at 582. The Government also relied upon a statute which might be construed to supersede the holding in Wade. This statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970), asserts
that "the testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be admissible in evidence
in any trial court ordained and established under Article III of the Constitution of the United
States." This statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 701 (a), 18
U.S.C. § 3502 (1970), could have far reaching implications indeed! See, e.g., United States
v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Scarpellino, 296 F. Supp.
269 (D. Minn. 1969).
23432 F.2d at 586. The court did not consider the question of whether 18 U.S.C. §
3502 (1970) overruled Wade.
24371 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
'See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
26432 F.2d at 582.
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this independent source was not effective in Edmons because the primary
illegality was the illegal arrest, not the illegal line-up. Thus, in Edmons, as
in Wong Sun, the critical issue was whether the illegal arrest required exclusion of certain evidence. In Edmons, however, the resolution of this question
went to the availability to the prosecutor of certain testimony at trial."' The
point to be emphasized is that the court refused to apply the Government's
exception, recognizing that one independent source will not remedy both the
Wade and Wong Sun problems, the application of each being based upon two
distinct primary illegalities. The court recognized no other independent source
possibility in tracing the route of the evidence from the illegal arrest to the
introduction of the testimony at trial. " Such an independent source would
have best been asserted by showing identification traceable to some other origin.
This would have occurred, for example, had one of the persons in the neighborhood at the time of the attack come forward to make an in-court identification. Such an identification would have been independent of the illegal
actions of the federal agents."
The FlagrantArrest as More Than Exploitation. The court in Edmons further
brought the case within the Wong Sun guidelines by establishing the flagrant
illegality of the arrest. Wong Sun recognized the exploitation of an arrest as
a "reminder that an exclusionary rule is a deterrent device.""' The court, however, pointed out that Edmons differed "significantly from most [cases] that
have dealt with the use of 'fruits' of [an] illegal arrest. The arrests here violated the Fourth Amendment not because law enforcement officers crossed
the line, often a shadowy one, that seperates probable cause from its lack, but
because they deliberately seized the appellants on a mere pretext for the purpose of displaying them to the agents who had been present at the scene of
of the crime.""1 The court emphasized the flagrancy of the pretextual arrest by
asserting that federal convictions are not easily rendered when such conditions
27 One interpretation of this "availability of testimony" concept suggests the application
of a "but-for" rule, a rule expressly rejected by Wong Sun. See note 38 infra. A cursory
reading of Edmons implies that it holds that illegal arrests warrant exclusion of identification at trial. Exclusion of in-court testimony is relatively new and controversial in that it
differs from the usual exclusion of tangible evidence such as documents and drug paraphernalia. However, several cases have barred such testimony from trial. See, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir.
1964). The significance of the in-court testimony in Edm ons was that it represented the
tainted fruit of the illegal arrest and was traced through the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine from that primary illegality to introduction into evidence at trial. Thus, while Edmons does not grant immunity from prosecution whenever an illegal arrest is established, it
does hold that when that arrest is exploited, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine may be
invoked.
2 This may explain why the indictment was dismissed. Most cases call for reversal and
remand to the lower court for inquiry into the existence of a possible independent source
exception. In Edmons the court recognized no other exceptions, and the in-court testimony
of the agents was the only evidence upon which the defendants might be convicted. Therefore, the indictment was ordered dismissed.
29 If this had occurred, the Government might have employed the independent source or
the inevitable discovery exception. See note 15 supra. The two doctrines overlap somewhat.
However, the independent source exception would probably be more effective because it is
the more
widely recognized.
0
3 Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 32, 38 (1967).
51432 F.2d at 583.
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are present. The court further admitted that if the in-court identifications had
not been excluded by an application of the fourth amendment, the evidence
might have been barred in the exercise of the court's "supervisory power.' ...
Hence, had an independent source been established, its importance would have
been somewhat undermined, assuming that the case turned primarily on the
flagrant arrest. The court defended this point of view by submitting that "a
ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . .has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence [and] courts which sit
under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions
of the constitutional rights of citizens."' The court admitted that "the Government's conduct here may not have been criminal [but] it departed so far
from constitutional standards that a federal court could not simply look the
other way.""
The Problem of the "But-For" Rule. Problems arising from the court's
decision stem mainly from the organization of the opinion. Judge Friendly
interjected Wade and Wong Sun reasoning throughout the opinion. Had he
isolated the Wade problem, analyzed it, rejected it, and proceeded to Wong
Sun and the flagrant arrest, his resolution of the case would be less confusing
and more resistant to criticism.'
The most pronounced criticism of the court's decision was asserted by the
dissent.36 It questioned whether a "but-for" rule was the basis for exclusion of
the testimony. The court cited Wong Sun as expressly rejecting this possibility
and submitted that "we need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police."" However, the "but-for" rule cannot rightfully be cast
aside by a mere citation to Wong Sun, since Wong Sun itself has been criticized as applying such a rule."8 Edmons should not be read as a case barring
in-court testimony simply as a result of an illegal arrest.' It should rather be
read as a case barring in-court testimony when such evidence is traced by the
logical sequence prescribed in the "fruit" doctrine to the discovery of an exploited primary illegality as its source. It was this exploitation, heightened by
2
1d.
I at 585.
RId., quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).

3'432 F.2d at 585.
' This lack of organization probably led to the dissent's argument for an application of
the independent source exception, one which culminated in the broad assertion that the
court was advocating immunity from prosecution. The dissent, quite understandably, regarded any independent source as potent enough to purge the taint of the illegal conduct. The
dissent should have distinguished the independent source as applied to the line-up problem
from that of the independent source as applied to the illegal arrest problem. However, the
organization of the majority opinion rendered this distinction almost impossible to ascertain
upon anything less than a close reading and detailed study of the case.
'*See note 27 supra, for another criticism concerning independent source problems and
the question of immunity.
s7371 U.S. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
U One author, for example, accepts the suggestion of a "but-for" inference in Wong Sun,
interpreting the court as asserting "that there are two steps in the task of analyzing a causal
connection:" (1) a logical and descriptive step to which a but-for test is appropriate; and
(2) an ascriptive step that relies on the continuous-motion manner of the evidence's journey
to its presentation in the courtroom. The author concludes by stressing the weight given to
the "exploitation."
Ruffin, supra note 30, at 38.
"9 See note 27 supra.

